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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
MARK S. BLAHA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920328-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992 Repl. Vol.). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
See Addendum A for text of relevant statutes, rules and 
constitutional provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the search warrant affidavit establish probable 
cause to search the duplex as required by the fourth amendment? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews the affidavit "in a 
common sense manner and as a whole [citation omitted]" to determine 
whether the magistrate had "a substantial basis for concluding that 
probable cause existed." State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 833 (Utah 
App. 1991); State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah App. 1991), 
overruled on other grounds. Case No. 910165 (Utah September 28, 
1992) . It "need not defer to the trial court's finding" and instead 
makes "an independent review of the trial court's determination of 
the sufficiency of the written evidence." Weaver, 817 P.2d at 833. 
Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have stated that 
the appellate court must give deference to a magistrate's 
determination that an affidavit established probable cause. Weaver. 
817 P.2d at 833; State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715, 719 (Utah 1983). 
Deference to the magistrate, however, is not 
boundless . . . [R]eviewing courts will not defer 
to a warrant based on an affidavit that does not 
"provide the magistrate with a substantial basis 
for determining the existence of probable 
cause." "Sufficient information must be 
presented to the magistrate to allow that 
official to determine probable cause; his action 
cannot be a mere ratification of the bare 
conclusions of others." 
Even if the warrant application was 
supported by more than a "bare bones" affidavit, 
a reviewing court may properly conclude that, 
notwithstanding the deference that magistrates 
deserve, the warrant was invalid because the 
magistrate's probable cause determination 
reflected an improper analysis of the totality of 
the circumstances, or because the form of the 
warrant was improper in some respect. 
United States v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897, 914-5 (1984) (citations 
omitted); accord State v. Droneburcr, 781 P.2d at 1305. Hence, the 
magistrate cannot act merely as a rubber stamp for police officers 
seeking warrants. Leon, 468 U.S. at 914. 
The deference given a magistrate's determination has been 
questioned by at least one member of this Court. See Weaver, 817 
P.2d at 835 (Orme, J., concurring). As Judge Orme pointed out: 
Either an affidavit establishes probable cause or 
it does not. No credibility issues exist; no 
evidence has to be weighed. Why should not an 
appellate court read the affidavit and decide for 
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itself the conclusion to be drawn, like it would 
with a written contract? 
Id. 
Rather than protecting fourth amendment values by 
encouraging police officers to draft sufficient affidavits and 
magistrates to issue search warrants only where an affidavit clearly 
establishes probable cause, this deference can result in searches 
being upheld in borderline situations where the affidavit on its 
face has failed to establish probable cause. If the "substantial 
basis" test if interpreted to uphold affidavits where probable cause 
does not exist on the face of the warrant, fourth amendment 
requirements will not always be met. See Weaver, 817 P.2d at 836 
(Orme, J., concurring; see also appellant's opening briefs in 
State v. Rosenbaum, Case No. 910514-CA, and State v. White. Case No. 
920248-CA, outlining reasons for not giving deference to 
magistrate's evaluation of search warrant. 
In evaluating the search warrant, this Court should assess 
it to determine whether on the face of the affidavit a substantial 
basis exists for finding probable cause. Any deference given to the 
magistrate should be limited to reasoned conclusions supported by 
the affidavit, and not interpreted to require upholding a search 
warrant where the affidavit on its face fails to establish probable 
cause.! 
1. Although case law indicates that deference is required, 
Appellant also asks this Court to reconsider that deference standard 
under the fourth amendment and, instead, make a de novo review of 
the search warrant. 
- 3 -
2. Did the affidavit establish proof that the object 
sought would be destroyed or physical harm may result so as to 
justify the issuance of a "no-knock" warrant? 
Standard of Review. Although Utah cases have stated that 
the reviewing court must give deference to the magistrate's 
determination of probable cause, those decisions refer specifically 
to the probable cause determination and not to the determination 
that a no-knock warrant is appropriate. See Romero. 660 P.d at 719; 
Weaver, 817 P.2d at 833. The deference standard has not been 
articulated in assessing a "no-knock" provision in the two lead 
cases from Utah appellate courts. See Rowe, 806 P.2d at 732-3; 
State v. Buck. 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 1988). 
The dangers presented by no-knock warrants and the 
requirement that "proof" be established before such warrants are 
issued suggest that deference should not be given to the 
magistrate's decision to issue a no-knock warrant. 
3. Did the issuance of a nighttime warrant, even though 
the warrant was executed in the daytime, violate the statute and the 
fourth amendment? 
Standard of Review. The standard of review set forth in 
point 2 applies. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The State charged Mark Blaha in an Information dated 
February 5, 1991, with one count of Possession of a Controlled 
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Substance, a third degree felony. R. 210-11.2 
Mr. Blaha filed a Motion to Suppress evidence seized from 
his home, claiming that the magistrate issued the search warrant in 
violation of the fourth amendment and Article I, § 14 of the Utah 
constitution. R. 228-9; a copy of the Motion to Suppress is 
contained in addendum B. 
Following an evidentiary hearing on December 4, 1991, and 
the filing of memoranda, the trial judge issued a Memorandum 
Decision in which he upheld the issuance of the search warrant 
(R. 268-71); a copy of the Memorandum Decision is contained in 
Addendum C. 
On March 16, 1992, Mr. Blaha entered a conditional plea of 
guilty to one count of Attempted Unlawful Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, a class A misdemeanor. R. 406. Pursuant to State v. 
Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), Mr. Blaha explicitly reserved 
his right to appeal the adverse ruling on his Motion to Suppress. 
R. 406. 
The trial judge placed Mr. Blaha on probation, then stayed 
the thirty-day jail sentence and payment of fine pending the outcome 
of this appeal. R. 419-20. 
2. Appellant Mark S. Blaha and Robert Todd White were each charged 
with one count of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, in 
a single Information. R. 210-11. Mr. White entered a Sery plea in 
his case and is pursuing an appeal in this Court in Case No. 920248. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 31, 1991, Detective Bill McCarthy obtained a 
"no-knock" nighttime search warrant to search the premises known as 
3720 South 3375 West, West Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
R. 235, 241. A copy of the Affidavit and Search Warrant is 
contained in Addendum D. 
The first three paragraphs of the affidavit in support of 
the search warrant contain standard information about the 
detective's background and experience and do not contain any 
information unique to this case. R. 237, 337. 
The fourth paragraph indicates that the detective had 
received information from a confidential informant ("CI") "that the 
suspects at the listed address are dealing in narcotics." R. 237. 
That paragraph indicates further that "[t]he CI information is first 
hand and from personal observations" and that the detective had 
corroborated the information from a separate source. R. 237. 
The next paragraph indicates that the CI had never been 
inside the premises nor witnessed a drug transaction. Instead, she 
had taken her husband ("the spouse") to the premises and had watched 
him go inside, then exit and ingest cocaine. The paragraph also 
indicates that the spouse had told the CI that the people who 
supplied him with drugs were inside the named premises. R. 237. 
The affidavit does not indicate the date on which the spouse's 
statement was made or the dates that the CI took the spouse to the 
premises, other than a single incident five days prior to the 
issuance of the search warrant. 
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According t:<> the affidavit, the spouse had threatened the 
• :i i I: she provided the police with information about the premises. 
The affidavit also indicates that the spouse told the CI that his 
supplier had threatened him because of late payment 38. 
The affidavit also indicates that a second source had 
observed the spouse at the premises. This second source also told 
detective later revealed that this second source was 
the parents the spouse. information from the second 
e 
affidavit also points out that the spouse has a criminal history < " 
"prior arrest tc* narcotics- " R. 238. 
Your affiant has been to the named premises 
and has observed what your affiant believes to be 
narcotics traffic. Your affiant has held 
surveillance on the named premises and has 
observed vehicles arrive and stay a verv «>... 
period of time. 
The tenth paragraph indicates that the spouse has been 
using cocaine for over t 
spouse pr\ purchasing cocaine at tl:i€ i lamed premises ! or the? 
past six months; and I hat the CI had observed the spouse enter and 
exit the premises - ecu » u 
The eleventh paragraph indicates that the spouse had gone 
the premises as late as 2:00 __.n. and that, according to the CI, 
the spouse had ingested cocaine inside the premises while purchasing 
cocaine. R. 238. 
The last paragraph on R. 238 and the first two full 
paragraphs on R. 239 indicate that the detective believed, based on 
his background and experience, that the officers should search for 
packaging material, drug paraphernalia, U.S. currency, and narcotics 
records since* such items are found in narcotics dealers7 homes. 
R. 238-9. 
The affidavit indicates that the detective checked utility 
records and found the names Brian Zeleniak and Cullen McCarty. 
R. 239. The affidavit does not mention Mr. Blaha or Robert White, 
who was also charged in the Information. 
Paragraph 18 requests a "night time-no knock search warrant 
because 
Your affiant has been told that the busiest time 
of the operation is during the late evening 
hours. Your affiant was told that the CI has 
been to the named premises as late as 2:00 a.m. 
for the purpose of purchasing cocaine." 
R. 239. 
Paragraph 19 also discusses the no knock service and 
contains a gemeral claim by the detective that unannounced entry is 
always safer than knocking, that narcotics dealers usually have 
weapons, and that the evidence is easily destroyed. That paragraph 
also indicates that "the supplier at the named premises has passed 
along threats to the spouse about police intervention in the illicit 
operation." R. 240. 
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The next to the last paragraph states: 
Your affiant considers the information 
received from the confidential informants 
reliable for the following reasons, 
SEE BODY OF AFFIDAVIT 
The officers executed the search warrant the morning after 
obtaining it at about 9:30 < A SWAT team did 
followed by police officers, R. 326-8. 
The officers located only a small amount of cocaine, one 
twenty-eighth of ounce, with a s t r e e t valui-" i * I" n|>p? ox iiniicit.e I f 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The search warrant affidavit failed *-~ establish probable 
cause to search. The Cls had never been inside nor witnessed a drug 
transaction i 
their reliability and veracity were not established. The affidavit 
did not contain dates 1 nr any oi tlie information except a single 
I IS'H Hit',1, i ><'in) i' I in,' search warrant was 
issued. No controlled buys were made at the premises, and the 
officer's surveillance was inconclusive poorly documented. 
1 a no-knock 
warrant should be issued. Neither the affidavit nor the search 
warrant listed drugs as being sought; the items listed w^tp i i 
€ asi ] j destr c y edl f i n thermore, even i f drugs had been listed, a 
"blanket rule" authorizing a no-knock warrant whenever drugs are 
sought violates the fourth amendment and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-23-10(2). 
Although this warrant was executed in the daytime, this 
Court should nevertheless review the propriety of issuing a 
nighttime search warrant in this case. A substantive basis for 
issuing a nighttime warrant did not exist. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT 
VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT SINCE THE AFFIDAVIT 
FAILED TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE 
PREMISES. 
The fourth amendment to the United States constitution 
requires that "probable cause supported by oath or affirmation" be 
established prior to issuance of a search warrant. "[W]hen a search 
warrant is issued on the basis of an affidavit, the affidavit in 
support of the search warrant must contain specific facts to support 
a determination by a neutral magistrate that probable cause 
exists." State v. Babbell. 770 P.2d 987, 990 (Utah 1990) (quoting 
State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 1986), cert, denied 480 
U.S. 930 (1987); see also State v. Dronebura. 781 P.2d 1303, 1304 
(Utah App. 1989). 
The affiant must state particularized facts and 
circumstances leading to a conclusion that probable cause exists. 
Mere conclusory statements will not suffice. Babbell, 770 P.2d at 
990, citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 
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2333, ?6 L.M.I'.rl 527, reh'q denied, 463 U . S . 1 2 3 7 # 104 S.Ct. ^ , // 
I hi ,>i| I -I'M I i I 'Ml i I • • 
In Illinois v. Gates, the United States Supreme Court 
adopted a "totality * the circumstances" test :i i I assessing whether 
affidavit establishes probable cause. 
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to 
make a practical, commonsense decision whether, 
given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' 
and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying 
hearsay information, there is a fair probability 
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place. And the duty of the 
reviewing court is simply to ensure that the 
magistrate had a 'substantial basis for . . . 
conclud[ing] that probable cause existed. 
462 .8. at 238-9 (emoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 
I ). 
Although in Gates, the United States Supreme Court rejected 
the Acruilar-Spinelli test for assessing probable cause when a 
"i i»in 11 i 11 • I'm 1 l i t i i mi 1 11 in ni l in mi in I mi i in • i 11 mi 11 mi i in<' m 11 in i o r m a t i u 1 1 , 1 1 « t c k n o w l e d g e d 
that elements of that former test were still useful. The Court 
stated that "an informant's 'veracity ' 'reliabil 11 , ' .mil "basin of 
relevant determining the value of his 
report -,* !30. 
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged tint t he Gates 
rcumstances test has not completely supplanted the 
Aquilar-Spinelli test. See State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 
1985) • State v . Bailey. hi1 V ,MI l"1 ft I M'l..h l'*84). 
In Anderson, M I . -'iJ at IJ 0 J • z „ lite Court stated: 
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[I]n State v. Bailev. we observed that even under 
the Gates "totality of the circumstances" 
standard, compliance with the Acruilar-Spinelli 
guidelines might be necessary to establish the 
requisite "fair probability" that the evidence 
sought actually exists and can be found where the 
informant so states. However, in other cases, "a 
less strong showing of the basis of the affiant's 
knowledge, veracity and reliability may be 
required, if the circumstances as a whole 
indicate that the informant's report is truthful. 
In the present case, the affidavit failed to establish 
probable cause to search the premises. The CI had never been inside 
and never witnessed any drug transactions. Although she had taken 
her husband to the premises and watched him enter and exit, then 
ingest cocaine, these situations were not controlled, and the spouse 
could have obtained the narcotics from sources other than the 
premises named in the search warrant. 
In addition, much of the CI's information was hearsay— 
purported statements by an alleged narcotics user to his spouse. 
There were no statements in the affidavit from anyone with firsthand 
knowledge who had witnessed a criminal transaction inside the 
premises. 
Moreover, the affidavit failed to state the dates on which 
the spouse made the alleged statements that he purchased drugs at 
the premises to the CI or his parents. R. 353. Other than the 
uncorroborated incident which occurred five days before the warrant 
was issued, the magistrate had no specific information regarding the 
recency of the events. The potential for information being fatally 
stale in this affidavit was high. See United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. at 904; People v. Stoppel, 637 P.2d 384, 391 (Colo. 1981) ("The 
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grounds in an affidavit for a search warrant must have a 
relationship to the date and time that the warrant is issued."); 
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States. 282 U.S. 344, 51 S.Ct. 153, 
75 L.Ed. 374 (1931) (warrants are not to issue on the basis of 
"loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact"); Orr v. State, 382 So.2d 
860 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1980) (reliable CI's claim that "within the 
past ten days" he had received information of another's drug 
possession was insufficient because CI did not state when drugs were 
actually observed); Ashley v. State. 241 N.E.2d 264 (Ind. 1968) 
(even though probable cause may have once existed for searching a 
building, probable cause no longer exists after an eight-day lapse 
because the drugs could have since been moved); United States v. 
Elliott. 576 F.Supp. 1579 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (undated reported 
surveillance and anonymous complaints were insufficient 
notwithstanding discovery of garbage containing illicit drugs). 
The magistrate would have had to infer that the information 
was recent in order to establish probable cause. While a certain 
amount of discretion is given to the magistrate to construe 
ambiguity in search warrant affidavits, requiring the magistrate to 
construe all ambiguities regarding timing in favor of recency would 
unduly extend such discretion. 
It is one thing to expect the magistrate to give 
a commonsense reading to the facts set forth and 
to draw inferences from them. It is quite 
another thing to expect the magistrate to reach 
for external facts and to build inference upon 
inference in order to create a reasonable basis 
for his belief that a crime is presently being 
committed." (emphasis in original) 
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LaFave, Search and Seizure. 3.7(b) (quoting Commonwealth v. Simmons, 
450 Pa. 624, 301 A.2d 819 (1973)). 
Furthermore, although the affidavit never stated that the 
activity occurred during the six-month period prior to the issuance 
of the warrant, even if the affidavit had mentioned the six-month 
period, such period would not have been specific enough to establish 
probable cause. 
Generally when the courts are forced to make an 
assumption as to when transactions occurred 
"within" a given period, for purposes of 
determining probable cause, it must be assumed 
that the transactions took place in the most 
remote part of the given period . . . The reason 
for this policy is obvious. If this were not the 
construction given to this phrase, stale 
information could be made to appear current by 
the mere use of "within" language. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure. 3.7(b) (quoting Commonwealth v. Novak. 
233 Pa. Super. 236, 335 A.2d 773 (1975)). In order to ensure a fair 
probability that the contraband will still be at the described 
premises, the magistrate must have some indicator as to timing. See 
People v. Abeyta. 795 P.2d 1324 (Colo. 1990) ("The test is whether 
the timing of the events is sufficiently set forth to justify a 
reasonable belief that the seizable objects are present . . . " ) . 
Pierson v. State. 338 A.2d 571 (Del. 1975). See also Merrv v. 
State. 766 P.2d 1377 (Okla. Cr. 1988) ("facts which would establish 
probable cause at one point in time may not be enough to establish 
probable cause at some other time," "the validity of the search 
warrant mandated evidence as to the date in order to show the 
reliability of the informant's statement"); Morris v. State. 617 
- 14 -
P.2d 252 (Okla. Cr. 1980) (affidavit found constitutionally 
insufficient for failure to state when informant obtained his 
information); State ex rel. Townsend v. District Ct. of Fourth J.P., 
543 P.2d 193 (Mont. 1975) (affidavit which omits reference to time 
of criminal event cannot establish probable cause); People v. 
Padilla. 511 P.2d 480 (Colo. 1973); Rosencranz v. United States. 356 
F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1966). 
By failing to specify the times and dates in the affidavit, 
the police provided the magistrate with insufficient information 
with which to make a reasonable determination as to probable cause. 
Although the State attempted to argue that the ongoing nature of the 
enterprise prevented the information from being stale, nothing in 
the affidavit attested to such an ongoing criminal enterprise. None 
of the confidential informants ever witnessed a criminal 
transaction, and it is not clear when the spouse made the alleged 
statements or whether he indicated on more than one occasion that he 
had purchased drugs from the house. 
In addition, the affidavit failed to outline the veracity 
or reliability of the informants. Although the officer believed 
"that the information provided by the CI is accurate and truthful," 
he failed to investigate the CI's motive for providing information 
or provide other information that would establish her veracity and 
reliability. While he claimed that her information was 
corroborated, the officer provided no direct information that drug 
transactions were occurring in the house and made no efforts to 
- 15 -
corroborate other than obtaining a rap sheet of the spouse and doing 
a single night of surveillance. 
The details of the detective's surveillance are 
inconclusive and poorly documented. The date, time or length of the 
surveillance are not noted. The affidavit states in conclusory 
terms that the detective observed what he believed "narcotics 
traffic" and that he observed "vehicles arrive and stay a very short 
period of time." The affidavit does not state how many vehicles 
arrived, the arrival time, nor how long each stayed. Nor does the 
affidavit refer to people actually entering the residence—it just 
mentions that vehicles came and went. Additionally, the affidavit 
does not clarify whether the vehicles were tied to the side of the 
duplex for which the search warrant was issued or the other side. 
Finally, the affidavit failed to list any narcotics or name 
the narcotics that the officers thought they would find. 
Although conclusive evidence of criminal activity is not 
required, the affidavit must nevertheless make a reasonable showing 
of a probability that the evidence sought will be found. The 
affidavit in this case was vague and inconclusive, based upon 
hearsay and conjecture, and failed to name the narcotics which were 
at the core of the investigation. Issuing this warrant without a 
substantial basis for doing so violated the fourth amendment. 
POINT II. THE AFFIDAVIT DID NOT JUSTIFY THE 
ISSUANCE OF A NO-KNOCK SEARCH WARRANT. 
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While the fourth amendment protects generally against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(2) 
outlines the specific procedure to be followed in obtaining a 
no-knock warrant. See generally State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 
1988). Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10(2) states that a search warrant 
can be executed: 
(2) Without notice of his authority and 
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the warrant 
directs in the warrant that the officer need not 
give notice. The magistrate shall so direct only 
upon proof, under oath, that the object of the 
search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or 
secreted, or that physical harm may result to any 
person if notice were given. 
In State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991), overruled 
on other grounds. Case No. 910165 (Utah September 28, 1992), this 
Court discussed the propriety of no-knock warrants and held that 
no-knock service is appropriate in a residential setting where 
officers are seeking a small amount of drugs which can be easily 
destroyed. Id. at 732-3. As occurred in Rowe and the present case, 
this approach has resulted in an almost "blanket rule" whereby 
officers searching for drugs obtain a no-knock warrant based on the 
ease of destruction of the drugs. See LaFave, 2 Search and Seizure 
§ 4.8(d), p. 280 (1987); People v. Gastelo, 432 P.2d 706 (Cal. 1976). 
Universally allowing no-knock service whenever drugs are 
sought goes against the dictates of the fourth amendment and 
§ 77-23-10(2). See State v. Sparao, 639 P.2d 782, 784-5 (Wash. App. 
1982); People v. Gastelo, 432 P.2d at 707, 708; Parsley v. SUP. Ct.. 
513 P. 611 (Cal. 1973). Although the United States Supreme Court 
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has not directly addressed the issue of whether the fourth amendment 
requires that notice be given before entry, such a notice 
requirement existed at commonlaw and can be "traced back as far as 
the decision in Semayne's Case. [5 Coke 91, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 
1603)] in 1603." 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(a) at 270-1. 
The purpose of requiring notice before entry is threefold: 
(1) the protection of an individual's private 
activities within his home, (2) the prevention of 
violence and physical injury to both police and 
occupants which may result from an unannounced 
police entry, and (3) the prevention of property 
damage resulting from forced entry. 
State v. Buck. 756 P.2d at 701. 
In the present case, the detective based his request for a 
no-knock warrant on general safety concerns and a claim that the 
property sought could be easily destroyed. Basing a no-knock 
warrant on a claim that the evidence sought could be easily 
destroyed is problematic in this case not only because of the 
"blanket rule" concern outlined above, but also because in this 
case, the warrant and affidavit did not state that the officers were 
seeking drugs. Instead, the warrant sought packaging materials, 
drug paraphernalia, residency papers, and records of drug 
transactions. R. 29. 
Because the evidence listed in the affidavit cannot be 
easily destroyed, a concern that evidence would be easily destroyed 
did not prove a basis for a no-knock warrant in this case. See 
State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d at 733 n.3 ("A more particularized showing 
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may well be required if, for example, a large quantity of drugs is 
sought.") . 
From the face of the warrant, it appears that the officers 
only expected to seize evidence of an ongoing drug operation and not 
drugs themselves. This ambiguity on the face of the warrant 
required further information before a neutral magistrate could issue 
a warrant based on the ease of destruction of the evidence. 
The officer's other basis for issuing a no-knock warrant 
was a general safety concern. First, the officer included his 
personal belief that it is always safer "if the officers have the 
safety of an unannounced entry*" R* 32. This statement does not 
contain any information specific to the present case. See State v. 
Rowe. 806 P.2d at 733. 
In addition, affidavits based on the belief of the affiant 
without showing underlying facts are not acceptable under the fourth 
amendment since they do not allow for an independent determination 
by a magistrate. See Allen v. Lindbeck. 93 P.2d 920 (Utah 1939). 
Furthermore, the detective's belief is contrary to the 
historically recognized dangers of executing a no-knock warrant. 
See 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(b) at 272-3. In this case, 
the trial judge questioned the detective's belief that no-knock 
nighttime warrants are the safest execution in drug cases . 
R. 66-74. Despite Detective McCarthy's testimony that someone was 
killed during the detective's last execution of a no-knock nighttime 
warrant (R. 29), the trial judge deferred to the detective's safety 
testimony in ruling. 
- 19 -
Next, the affidavit indicates that a no-knock warrant was 
necessary because drug dealers usually carry guns. This information 
also was not specific to the instant case. The officer included no 
information that the persons inside the house were armed. These 
generalities and speculations are not a sufficient basis to risk the 
dangers posed by a no-knock warrant. See Tatman v. State. 320 A.2d 
750# 751 (Del. 1974) ("an unsupported assertion of 'fear that the 
defendant might have a weapon#,f insufficiently supported a good 
faith belief that a "no knock" entry was necessary); State v. 
Schmidtf 740 P.2d 351, 355 (Wash. App. 1987) ("general speculation 
that a defendant may be armed and police safety endangered is not 
sufficient to constitute exigent circumstances excusing compliance 
with the knock and announce rule [and] . . . [a]n informant's 
statement that the defendant kept a weapon was not sufficient"); 
State v. Piller. 628 P.2d 976, 979 (Ariz. App. 1981) (it was not 
enough that officers knew the defendant "had negotiated for the 
purchase of a .357 magnum handgun and that there was a possibility 
of such a weapon being in the residence [because] [p]olice knowledge 
of the existcmce of a firearm excuses compliance with announcement 
requirements only where the officers reasonably believe the weapon 
will be used against them if they proceed with the ordinary 
announcement, and this belief must be based on specific facts and 
not on broad, unsupported presumptions"); Id. ("the need for 
compliance with the knock-notice requirements is stronger where the 
police had knowledge of the presence of a weapon in the house and 
there is nothing to suggest that the occupants have a propensity to 
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use the weapon against them, because there is more danger of a 
deadly encounter if the householder is startled by an unexpected 
intruder"); People v. Ouellette, 401 N.E.2d 507, 511 (111. 1979) 
(prior police knowledge of a defendant's possession of a handgun and 
pistol box does not justify a "no knock" search because the officer 
did not demonstrate that defendant was likely to use firearms, or 
that he presently unlawfully possessed them, or that he attempted to 
use weapons or had threatened the police); People v. Bennetto, 517 
P.2d 1163 (Cal. 1974) (citing People v. Dumas, 512 P.2d 1208 (Cal. 
1973) ("where the police are aware of [the resident's possession of] 
such a weapon, the case for requiring [officers] to give notice of 
their authority and purpose becomes more rather than less 
compelling"); State v. Pierson, 472 N.W.2d 898, 902 (Neb. 1991) 
("The fact that a person is a member of a class of persons more 
likely to resist search is not sufficient to justify unannounced 
entry. The officers must have knowledge of specific facts that 
indicate that this particular person will conduct himself or herself 
in this [violent] manner when confronted by police."). 
Finally, the affidavit indicated that "the supplier at the 
named premises has passed along threats to the spouse about police 
intervention." R. 33. These threats were not articulated nor given 
any time frame. Furthermore, as the trial judge indicated while 
questioning the detective (R. 371), even if persons inside the house 
had made recent unspecified threats to the spouse, such threats did 
not indicate that violence would occur to police officers if they 
were to announce themselves prior to executing a search warrant. 
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The warrant failed to state a particularized basis for 
issuance of a no-knock warrant; the no-knock warrant in this case 
was issued in violation of the fourth amendment and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-23-10(2). 
POINT III. THE AFFIDAVIT FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT A NIGHTTIME 
SEARCH WAS NECESSARY. 
The warrant in this case authorized a nighttime search. 
Nevertheless, the officers executed the search warrant during the 
morning. R. 326. 
Although the trial judge ruled that the fact that the 
search warrant was executed in the daytime mooted the nighttime 
search warrant issue (see Memorandum Decision), this Court should 
reverse that ruling and review the nighttime aspect of this warrant. 
The importance of meaningful evaluation by magistrates of 
affidavits seeking no-knock nighttime search warrants suggests that 
where officers ultimately decide not to serve a warrant at night, 
the propriety of the nighttime service provision should nevertheless 
be reviewed to assure that the affidavit was independently reviewed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1) requires that warrants be 
served in the daytime unless the magistrate inserts a nighttime 
provision based on "reasonable cause to believe a search is 
necessary in the night." Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5(1) states: 
(1) The magistrate must insert a direction in 
the warrant that it be served in the daytime, 
unless the affidavits or oral testimony state a 
reasonable cause to believe a search is necessary 
in the night to seize the property prior to it 
- 22 -
being concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, 
or for other good reason; in which case he may 
insert a direction that it be served any time of 
the day or night. An officer may request other 
persons to assist him in conducting the search. 
In Rowe, 806 P.2d at 733, this Court stated: 
The showing required by the present statute 
focuses not upon a positive showing that the 
property is at the place to be searched, but upon 
whether there are special circumstances which 
would justify a search at night. 
The Rowe court added: 
[T]he statute clearly requires a particularized 
showing either that 1) a search is required in 
the night because the property is on the verge of 
being "concealed, destroyed, damaged, or 
altered," or 2) "for other good reason." 
The affidavit in the present case failed to make the 
required particularized showing; nothing in the affidavit attempted 
to explain why a nighttime search was necessary. The property 
sought in the affidavit did not include a controlled substance, and 
the items listed were not easily concealable. Nor did the officers 
have any particular reason to believe that the property would be 
removed, altered or consumed. See generally State v. Paul. 225 Neb. 
432, 405 N.W.2d 608 (1987). 
As this Court stated in Rowe. there is "nothing inherent in 
a narcotics search which would necessitate a search at night." 
Unlike Rowe. Case No. 910165, slip op. at 5, there were no 
substantive grounds for a nighttime search warrant in this case, and 
the officers did not have a separate arrest warrant for any of the 
occupants. In this case, there was no basis for issuance of a 
nighttime warrant, and the issuance of a nighttime warrant violated 
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the fourth amendment.3 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial judge's order denying his motion to suppress, and reverse his 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this ' day of October, 1992. 
^iUuC.uXt/ 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
3. The detective testified that he requested the nighttime warrant 
because the CI had told him and he had observed that the busiest 
time of operation was at night. R. 329. This testimony is puzzling 
in light of the detective's further testimony that the residents 
were in a band that performed at night. R. 331. The more prudent 
time to search would be in the morning, when band members were at 
home; this is underscored by the fact that the officers actually 
served the warrant in the morning. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused eight 
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this ' day of October, 1992. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED/MAILED this day of October, 1992. 
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ADDENDUM A 
77-1EM0. Force used in executing warrant — Notice of au-
thority prerequisite, when. 
(2) Without notice of his authority and purpose, if the magistrate issu-
ing the warrant directs in the warrant that the officer need not give 
notice. The magistrate shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, that 
the object of the search may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, 
or that physical harm may result to any person if notice were given. 
77-23-5. Time for service — Officer may request assis-
tance. 
(1) The magistrate must insert a direction in the warrant that it be served 
in the daytime, unless the affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable 
cause to believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to 
it being concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other good reason; in 
which case he may insert a direction that it be served any time of the day or 
night. An officer may request other persons to assist him in conducting the 
search. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, oven 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involv-
ing a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and 
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirma-
tion, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
ADDENDUM B 
ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN, #4276 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW, #3768 
Attorneys for Defendants 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 . ., .. , „„„ 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY SEIZED 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
vs. 
MARK S. BLAHA, 
ROBERT TODD WHITE, 
Defendants, 
Case Nc ^911900752FS 
9ilFcru737Fr 
JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
COMES NOW the defendants, MARK S. BLAHA and ROBERT TODD 
WHITE, through their attorneys of record, ELIZABETH A. BOWMAN and 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW, to move this Court to suppress the fruits of the 
search warrant as being unconstitutionally obtained under the fourth 
amendment to the Federal Constitution and Art, I § 14 of the Utah 
Constitution because the search warrant was erroneously issued 
without probable cause. The evidence should similarly be suppressed 
because the warrant was a night time, no-knock warrant lacking 
sufficient justification for such provisions. 
Defendant asserts the following in support of his motion: 
1) The affidavit relied upon (copy attached) in seeking 
the search warrant fails to establish any indicia of reliability of 
the confidential informant. 
i i l i228 
2) The affidavit relied upon indicates the confidential 
informant incriminates his or her spouse without any indication of 
the status of the marriage or why such finger pointing should be 
reliable. 
3) The affidavit fails to state when the spousal informant 
made the alleged observations and what deals were made for the 
informant not to be charged with arranging since he or she 
purportedly drove the spouse to obtain drugs. 
4) The affidavit fails to state when any surveillance was 
made of the premises or for how long or for how many times or if Mr. 
Blaha or Mr. White were ever at the residence during such 
surveillance. 
5) The affidavit fails to state with any particularity why 
the "second source" is reliable. 
6) The affidavit fails to state what threats have 
allegedly been made to the informant by the "spouse," or when any 
such threats were made, or if they can be cooborated. 
7) The information in the affidavit is stale and there is 
nothing to indicate controlled substances would be present on 
January 31, 1991. 
8) The affidavit contains false statements and material 
ommissions of fact. 
9) There are no facts provided to justify the inclusion of 
the no knock, nightime provisions. 
uU229 
Mr. Blaha and Mr. White move to suppress any evidence 
illegally seized in reliance on the search warrant which they assert 
should not have been issued because the affidavit failed to provide 
a sufficient basis for a determination of probable cause. 
DATED this ^/ day of 5}2*e, 1991. 
.•^ IrfZAlEttTH A. /£6WMAN 
/ Attorney for Defendant 
C. BRADSHAW 
ey for Defendant 
u0230 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT AND THE SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY: 
You and each of you please take notice that the 
above-entitled matter j^ll come on regularly for hearing on 
the Z£j day of w9 1991, at the hour of 2 ^ m., 
before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Third District Court Judge, 
Please govern yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this D day of Jjife, 1991. 
•^ ELIZABETH /A. BCKjMAN 
/Attorney for Defendant 
JAME£ 'a^BRAD! 
Attorney for ndant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of 
the County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this day of e, 1991. 
DELIVERED BY 






Third Judicial District 
JAN 2 3 1992 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARK S. BLAHA, 
ROBERT TODD WHITE, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 911900752 
911900753 
Before the Court is the Motion of the defendants 
above-named, through their counsel of record, to suppress 
evidence seized as a result of a search warrant authorizing 
search of the premises known as 3720 South 3375 West in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. The warrant was issued on January 
31, 1991 after presentation to Circuit Court Judge William A. 
Thome, acting as magistrate of the Third Circuit Court. 
The matter was before the Court on December 4, 1991, where 
evidence was presented and oral argument had. Following oral 
argument, the Court indicated that it would take the matter 
under advisement and allow counsel time to brief a legal issue 
that had arisen based upon the evidence received during the 
hearing on the question of whether or not the daytime execution 
p, C\ -» ^  ^ 
STATE V. BLAHA AND WHITE PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
of this warrant moots any potential defects that may have been 
part of the issuance of the warrant relating to nighttime 
execution. The parties have filed their respective pleadings, 
the Court has considered the same, and being fully advised, 
enters the* following Memorandum Decision. 
The Court is satisfied that the allegations in the 
Affidavit, taken as a whole, are sufficient to authorize the 
issuance of a search warrant. The Court is further satisfied 
that the evidence supports a finding that the additional 
provision in the search warrant authorizing "no knock" 
execution is satisfactory. The evidence suggests that the "no 
knock" warrant in this case was appropriate because of the 
potential of the destruction of evidence, particularly where 
small amounts may be involved, and for the safety of not only 
officers executing the warrant, but the persons who may be on 
the premises when the warrant is executed. 
While the Court expressed concerns in its questioning of 
the State's witnesses in this matter regarding the concept of 
safety, the Court does not claim any expertise in police 
procedures, nor does the Court claim any expertise in the 
execution of "no knock" warrants and the hazards related 
thereto, and the evidence the Court has before it is from a 
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STATE V. BLAHA AND WHITE PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
police professional who has expressed his opinions, stated the 
reasons therefore, and the Court is not at liberty to ignore 
that evidence, absent some legitimate reason to do so, and no 
legitimate legal reason appears to exist. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that there is 
sufficient basis for the issuance of the "no knock" special 
provisions of this warrant. 
Turning to the question of whether or not there is 
sufficient basis to authorize the execution of the warrant 
during the nighttime, the Court is satisfied that any potential 
defects in the contents of the supporting documentation and the 
warrant authorizing its execution at nighttime has been mooted, 
inasmuch as the warrant was not executed in the nighttime, but 
rather during the daytime. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that the 
defendants7 Motions to Suppress must and should be denied. 
Counsel for the State is to prepare an Order indicating the 
Court's denial of the defendants' Motion to Suppress, and 
present the same to the Court for review and signature pursuant 
to the Code of Judicial Administration. 
This matter is further scheduled on the Court's calendar to 
determine what additional dates, trial or otherwise, are 
UU270 
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necessary to bring this matter to a conclusion. Counsel and 
the defendants are to be present at they/date indicated in the 
attached notice. 
Dated this ^3K day of January,/1992. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
azz^ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, 
this ^ T day of January, 1992: 
Kenneth R. Updegrove 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2001 S. State, Suite S3700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
Roger K. Scowcroft 
Elizabeth A. Bowman 
Attorneys for Defendants 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM D 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
NO 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the state of Utah. 
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by Det. 
Bill McCarthy, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe 
That ( ) on the persons of 
( ) in the vehicles described as 
(X) on the premises known as a 3720 SOUTH 3375 WEST, the duplex on 
the west side of the road, 3720 is the southern most half of the duplex, the 
apartment to the north has the numbers 3718 on the front of the premises, to 
include all containers, rooms, attics, and basements found therein. 
In the City of WEST VALLEY, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there 
is now being possessed or concealed certain property or evidence described 
as: 
SEE ATTACHMENT "A" 
which property or evidence: 
(x) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed or 
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense or 
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of 
committing or concealing a public offense or 
(x) consist of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, 
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
fou are therefore commanded: 
( ) in the day time 
(x) at any time of the day (good cause having been shown) 
(x) to execute without notice of authority or purpose, 
(proof under oath being shown that the object of this 
search may be quickly destroyed or disposed of or 
that harm may result to any person if notice were given.) 
i»0232 




1. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES, 
PLASTIC BAGGIES, TAPE, PAPER BINDLES CUT INTO SQUARES. 
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES, 
BENT SPOONS, COTTON BALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, SHORT STRAWS, 
PIPES FOR SMOKING COCAINE, GLASSWARE USED TO MAKE CRACK COCAINE, 
CUT MATERIAL, MARIJUANA PIPES, ROLLING PAPERS AND BONGS. 
3. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY 
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES 
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES. 
4. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS 
BEING SEARCHED FOR. 
5. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE 
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND 




to make a search of the above-named or described person(s), vehicle(s), and 
premises for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find 
the same or any part thereof to bring it forthwith before me at the Third 
Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such property in 
your custody, subject to the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this T / day of .Js*^ ,1391. 
JUDGE, JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OR 
MAGISTRATE OF THE 3RD CIRCUIT CC 
"<>234 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he has reason to believe 
That ( ) on the person of 
( ) in the vehicle described as 
(X) on the premises known as 3720 SOUTH 3375 WEST, the 
duplex on the west side of the road, 3720 is the southern most half 
of the duplex, the apartment to the north has the numbers 3718 on 
the front of the premises, to include all containers, rooms, attics 
and basements found therein. 
In the City of West Valley, County of Salt Lake, State of 
Utah, there is now certain property of evidence described as: 
SEE ATTACHMENT "A" 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or 
(X) is being possessed with he purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense; or 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to 
the illegal conduct. (Note requirements of Utah Code 
Annotated, 77-23-3(2) 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crime(s) of possession of a controlled substance, 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. 
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1. PACKAGING MATERIAL, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SCALES, 
PLASTIC BAGGIES, TAPE, PAPER BINDLES CUT INTO SQUARES. 
2. DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SYRINGES, 
BENT SPOONS, COTTON BALLS, MIRRORS, RAZOR BLADES, SHORT STRAWS, 
PIPES FOR SMOKING COCAINE, GLASSWARE USED TO MAKE CRACK COCAINE, 
CUT MATERIAL, MARIJUANA PIPES, ROLLING PAPERS AND BONGS. 
3. RESIDENCY PAPERS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, UTILITY 
RECEIPTS AND OR BILLS, RENTAL/LEASE AGREEMENTS, AND ARTICLES 
SHOWING OCCUPANCY OF THE PREMISES. 
4. U.S. CURRENCY BELIEVED TO BE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE NARCOTICS 
BEING SEARCHED FOR. 
5. NARCOTIC RECORDATIONS, TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PRICE 
LIST, AMOUNTS SOLD, TIMES, DATES, AMOUNTS PURCHASED, AND 
ESPECIALLY DRUG INDEBTNESS. 
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The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search 
Warrant are: 
Your affiant, Detective Bill McCarthy, 8022, is employed by 
the West Valley City Police Department• Your affiant was assigned 
to the Metro Narcotics Strike Force for a period of over three 
years. Your affiant is presently assigned to the West Valley City 
Police Departmentf Detective Division, and is assigned to 
investigate narcotic related offenses occurring within West Valley 
City. 
Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification and 
in the investigation of narcotics related offenses. Affiant has 
personally purchased various narcotics on numerous occasions in 
relation to police investigations. Affiant was assigned to the 
Metro Narcotics Strike Force for over 3 years. Your affiant is a 
certified peace officer in the State of Utah for over 10 years. 
Your affiant's specialized training includes the DEA basic and 
advanced investigators seminars, as well as the California 
Narcotics Officers Association seminars in drug recognition, 
identification and investigative techniques and Alcohol Tobacco and 
Firearms Undercover Investigative Techniques. 
Further your affiant would like to inform the courts that your 
affiant has been the affiant or has assisted in the preparation and 
service of several hundred narcotic search warrants. Also several 
of those search warrants were surveillance search warrants. 
Your affiant had received information from a confidential 
informant that the suspects at the listed address are dealing in 
narcotics. Your affiant believes that the information provided by 
t h e C I i s a /^f , l]r-rtt'Q ^nfl t r u t h f u l for* f h a f n l l n w v i t t j 1 nt iMift i^. The CI 
< information^?-^^rst hand^and from personal observations) Further 
vr/the CI has nolft*p?femised nor pax3 anything for the Information 
/ provided. Lastly your affiant has corroborated the information 
provided by the CI from a separate source. 
Your affiant was told by the CI that the persons residing at 
the premises listed are trafficking in narcotics. The CI basis this 
belief on the following. The CI reports that over the last 6 months 
the CI's spouse has been purchasing cocaine from the listed 
premises. Further the CI has been to the named premises on at least 
two occasions when the CI's spouse didin^farf purchase cocaine. 
The most recent purchase being within^tHe^last 5 daysI>Your affiant 
was further told by the CI that the Ci nas never been inside the 
named premises and actually observed a transaction, however the CI 
has observed the CI's spousS' enter tnen 6Xlt the named premises. , 
JtftSr the CI's has edited tfie named premises the CI has observed 
the_spjQnse ingest cocaine. Further the spouse has indicated to the I 
CI that the persons inside the named prpmigpg—ajM—the—spouses 
supplier of cocaine. 
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CI told your affiant that the CI has been threatened by the 
spouse if the CI came forward to the police with the information) 
provided. Further the CI was told by the spouse that the supplier/ 
of—the cocrHnp h^s ^hr^af^p^^ the spo"^-^hgn^jthe spouse has oeen| 
late in repaying^ for cocaine that was receivecT~by "Clre- spouse, 
Your affiant has interviewed a second source of informa£i<rff 
who has observed the spouse at the named premises. Your affiant was 
also told by the second source"'that the spouse has a long history 
of substance abuse, cocaine. Your affiant cannot disclose the 
identity of the CI nor the second source for fear it would 
jeopardize each real identity to the supplier. Further your affiant 
was told by the CI that the CI has been threatened by the spouse 
that the supplier would "get even" if the CI went to the police. 
Your affiajife—Relieves that the information from the second 
source Is accu^t^ahd truthful for the following reasons. The 
souifces information's \first hand and further the second source is 
a relative of the spouse. Further your affiant has reviewed the 
criminal history of the spouse and the spouse does show prior 
arreS-fe^ for narcotics^ 
Your affiant has been to the named premises and has observed 
what your affiant believes to be narcotics traffic. Your affiant 
has held surveillance on the named premises and has observed 
vehicles arrive and stay a very short period of time. 
Your affiant believes that the operation is ongoing for the 
following reasons. The CI states to your affiant that the spouse 
has been using cocaine for over 2 years. CI states that the spouse 
has been purchasing cocaine from the named premises for at least 
the last 6 months. The CI has observed the spouse ingest the 
cocaine intravenously for over the last year. Further the CI has 
been to the named premises and has observed the spouse enter then 
exit the named premise with cocaine, the most recent being within 
the last 5 days. 
Your affiant was told by a second family member that the 
spouse does have a cocaine abuse problem and further that the 
spouse has been observed at the named premisesf then later admitted 
to have purchased cocaine at the named premises. 
Lastly your affiant was told by the CI that the CI has been to 
the named premises as late as 2:00 am with the spouse to purchase 
pacaine. CI also toicr^ yduif atfiaftt that the spouse has ingsF**^ 
duuaiiie—iiitfldtf llie—lwiuecT ^ pr amices- Whxie purcnasing additional 
J ^ ^ ^ ^ O"—I^rifAr^l n^_ • 
Your affiant believes that the named premises should be 
searched for packaging material as well as drug paraphernalia. Your 
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affiant knows from training and experience that suspect's selling 
narcotics often keep instruments used in the ingestion of narcotics 
on hand to allow customers to test the narcotics to be purchased. 
Further your affiant knows that the packaging material is an 
inherent part of any narcotics sales operation. The packaging 
material is needed to weight out and package additional quantities 
of, narcotics for resale. 
Your affiant believes that the named premise should be 
searched for OS currency. Your affiant believes that the currency 
will be in close proximity to the narcotics being searched for and 
further that currency is evidence of the illicit operation. Money 
is needed to make change during subsequent sales and used to 
replenish depleted narcotic supplies, CI also told your affiant 
that the spouse has spent as much as $1,000.00 in a single day at 
the named premises purchasing cocaine. 
Your affiant believes that the named premises should be 
searched for narcotics records. Your affiant knows from training 
and experience that narcotics dealers frequently keep such list 
identifying amounts sold, persons sold to, amounts owed and 
especially drug indebtness. Your affiant was told that the CI's 
spouse has been threatened over drug indebtness to the suppliers. 
Your affiant believes that the named premises should be 
searched for occupancy papers. Your affiant has checked the utility 
records of the listed premises and they show in the name of 
ZELENIAK, BRIAN and McCARTY, CDLLEN. Your affiant has also observed 
other vehicles at the named premises and would like to identify all 
the occupants for possible future prosecution. 
Your affiant ask the courts not to require your affiant to 
publish the name of the CI for the following reasons. The CI is a 
citizen informant and your affiant fears for CI's personal safety. 
Further your affiant believes if the CI's name is published, 
threats that have been made against the CI will be carried out.. 
Your affiant prays for a night time-no knock service search 
warrant. Your affiant has been told that the busiest time of\ I \\jjjv—j 
operation is during the late evening hours. Your affiant was toldv^ 
that the CI has been to the named premises as late as 2:00 am for 
the purpose of purchasing cocaine. -. ^ -
Your affiant prays for no-knock service for the following 
reasons. Your affiant firmly believes it always safer for all 
participants, police officers, participants and non-participants to 
the sales operation if the officers have the safety of an 
unannounced entry• Your affiant has been on numerous narcotics 
search warrants were weapons have been readily available to the 
occupants. Further your affiant knows from training and experience 
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that more and more narcotics dealers are arming themselves to 
protect the sales operations from other dealers/users. Further the 
supplier at the named premises has passed along threats to the 
spouse about police intervention in the illicit operation. Lastly 
the property being sought pursuant to this warrant/affidavit is 
very easily destroyed. 
Your affiant has had this warrant reviewed by a Deputy Salt 
Lake County Attorney and it has been approved for presentation to 
the courts. 
Your affiant considers the information received from the 
confidential informants reliable for the following reasons, 
SEE BODY OF AFFIDAVIT 
Your affiant has verified the above information from the 
confidential informants to be correct and accurate through the 
following independent investigation: 
SEE BODY OF AFFIDAVIT 
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WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for 
the seizure of said items: 
( ) in the day time/ until 7:00pm• 
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason 
to believe it is necessary to seize the property 
prior to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged/, 
or altered, or for other good reasons to wit: 
SEE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN BODY OF AFFIDAVIT 
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer 
executing the requested warrant not be required to give notice of 
the officer's authority or purpose because: 
(X) physical harm may result to any person if notice 
were given; or 
(X) the property sought may be quickly destroyed, 
disposed of, or secreted. 
This danger is believed to exist because: 
SEE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IN BODY OF AFFIDAVIT 
FIANT DET. BILL MCCARTHY 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ^3/ day of
 f >Us»—T1991, 
JUDGE S 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COUJWF, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE CC 
STATE OF UTAH 
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